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Abstract
Rudolf Carnap’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt (The Logical Struc-
ture of the World) is generally conceived of as being the failed mani-
festo of logical positivism. In this paper we will consider the following
question: How much of the Aufbau can actually be saved? We will ar-
gue that there is an adaptation of the old system which satisfies many
of the demands of the original programme. In order to defend this the-
sis, we have to show how a new “Aufbau-like” programme may solve
or circumvent the problems that affected the original Aufbau project.
In particular, we are going to focus on how a new system may address
the well-known difficulties in Carnap’s Aufbau concerning abstraction,
dimensionality, and theoretical terms.
1 Introduction
Rudolf Carnap’s (1928) classic Der logische Aufbau der Welt (The Logi-
cal Structure of the World) was abandoned at least twice: at first when
the Vienna circle turned from logical positivism to logical empiricism or
from epistemology to philosophy of science; secondly when philosophy of
science moved from its understanding of being a “logic of science” towards
its new emphasis on naturalistic-pragmatic-historical-sociological features of
science.
More recently, the Aufbau has attracted attention from philosophers who
question its traditional interpretation as being the modernized upshot of
British empiricism. While these reinterpretations of the Aufbau have ini-
tiated a renewal of interest in its content, its assessment as a famous and
perhaps even notorious failure has remained unchanged.
In this paper, we will deal with the Aufbau not from a historical but from
a systematic point of view.1 We are going to argue that the old Aufbau has a
core part which might actually be saved : although the original programme
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cannot be restored itself, there is hope for a “new Aufbau” which shares
several important properties with its predecessor.
This is the plan of the paper: In section 2 we start with an exposition
of the old Aufbau’s aims, and we constrast them with the weakened inten-
tions that lie behind the development of the new system. Then we turn
to the problems of the original Aufbau. If any attempt of introducing a
new Aufbau is to be successful, it has to demonstrate how the problems that
affected Carnap’s Aufbau are either circumvented or solved. We will concen-
trate our efforts on two representative problem sets: Goodman’s problems
of abstraction and dimensionality (section 4) and Quine’s problem of holism
and theoretical terms (section 5). Both problems can only be explained sat-
isfyingly if what is called the “basis” in the Aufbau is outlined beforehand:
this will be done in section 3. In sections 6, 7 and 8 we will finally introduce
the new system and see how it addresses Goodman’s and Quine’s worries.
Section 9 will end up with a summary of what has been achieved and with
an outlook of future work on a new Aufbau.
2 A New Epistemological Project
According to the traditional interpretation – exemplified by Quine (1951),
Goodman (1963), and, retrospectively, by Carnap himself (1963) – the aim
of the Aufbau is to support the following thesis:
• Old thesis: Every scientific sentence can be translated via explicit de-
finitions into another sentence that consists solely of logical signs and
terms that refer to “the given”, such that in each of the underlying def-
initions the defined expression and the defining expression necessarily
have the same extension.
The new interpretation by Friedman (1999), Richardson (1998) and a few
others ascribes an even stronger claim to the Aufbau:
• Old thesis: Every scientific sentence can be translated via explicit de-
finitions into another sentence that is purely structural, i.e., which
consists solely of logical signs, such that in each of the underlying def-
initions the defined expression and the defining expression necessarily
have the same extension.
Whilst the first interpretation considers the Aufbau as the result of applying
the then new logical means of Whitehead & Russell’s Principia Mathemat-
ica to the traditional empiricist-phenomenalist programme, the second one
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understands the Aufbau as being influenced by the Neo-Kantian tradition
and emphasizes its neutrality with respect to all traditional epistemological
positions. While the intention of the Aufbau, according to its traditional
interpretation, is to show how scientific claims may ultimately be reduced
to claims about the contents of our immediate subjective experience, the
more recent interpretation has it that science is ultimately about the struc-
ture of experience, where ‘structure’ is supposed to denote something that
is intersubjective rather than subjective.
Let us consider the two theses from above in more detail now:
In the first thesis, ‘given’ denotes what is given by experience, in partic-
ular, by sense experience. Indeed, for the rest of this paper, sense experience
will be the only form of “data” that we are interested in.
‘scientific sentence’ refers to any sentence in a language of any scientific
discipline that uses its terms in a clear and non-ambiguous way.
A translation is to be regarded a mapping from “the” set of scientific
sentences to itself. The two theses claim that that there are translation
mappings of a particular and distinguished kind: (a) they are induced by a
system of definitions in the way that a scientific sentence A is translated to
another scientific sentence tr(A) if and only if the stepwise replacement of the
defined terms in A by their defining (and ultimately) primitive terms yields
tr(A); (b) the corresponding primitive vocabulary conforms to the syntactic
restrictions that are explained in the theses – logical terms and terms that
refer to the given in the first case, only logical terms in the second one;
(c) finally, the transition from a defined expression to its defining one is to
preserve extension necessarily.2
As Carnap explains in §50 of the Aufbau, the translations of sentences
and terms are claimed to preserve what Carnap then called “logical value”,
i.e., extension. In the preface of the second edition of the Aufbau, Carnap
clarifies his view by pointing out that what he actually demands is the nec-
essary preservation of extension, i.e.: the translation image of an expression
ought to have the same extension as the translated one by logical rules or by
laws of nature. In particular, if a sentence A is translated to a sentence tr(A)
by substituting a defined expression by its defining expression, then the de-
fined expression should necessarily have the same extension as the defining
one and consequently A is to be necessarily materially equivalent to tr(A).
As far as the translation of sentences is concerned – and this is what Carnap
aims at ultimately – the goal is thus more than just the preservation of truth
values; rather it is the preservation of truth conditions. Indeed, demanding
only the preservation of truth values for sentences would seem to be too
weak, because any translation function which maps all true sentences to,
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say, ∀xx = x, and all false sentences to ¬∀xx = x would meet this cri-
terion. However, even in order to set up a translation like this, one would
have to know which scientific sentences are true and which are false, which is
certainly beyond human capabilities, and which certainly is not presupposed
by the Aufbau. Indeed, according to the Aufbau programme, the transla-
tion mappings whose existence is claimed by the two theses above should
be definable a priori – before any empirical investigation into the truth or
falsity of scientific hypothese even commences. Carnap is well aware of the
fact that definitions are normally demanded to preserve sense or (in Aufbau
terminology) “Erkenntniswert” rather than truth conditions, but he argues
that the preservation of truth conditions is in fact all that is needed for sci-
entific purposes as opposed to, e.g., aesthetic purposes. If tr is a translation
that is based on definitions and which preserves truth conditions, and if A
is translated to tr(A), then Carnap holds that A can be replaced by tr(A)
in all scientific contexts without any scientifically significant loss.
Now we turn to what could be the aims of a new Aufbau. When we say
that the old Aufbau has a core part that may actually be saved, this really
amounts to the claim that a thesis sufficiently close to the two theses above
is true. When we say that the original programme itself cannot be restored,
this means that the new thesis has to be weaker than the two theses from
above. Here is the corresponding thesis that guides our new attempt at an
Aufbau-like system:
• New thesis:
– Every scientific sentence can be translated to an empirically equiv-
alent one which consists solely of logico-mathematical signs and
terms that refer to experience, such that
– the translation image expresses a subject-invariant constraint on
experience.
We have highlighted the differences between the new thesis and the old
ones in italics: First of all, if A is translated to tr(A), then the two sentences
are no longer demanded to be materially equivalent, let alone necessarily ma-
terially equivalent; instead, A and tr(A) should be empirically equivalent.
More particularly, we want tr(A) to express the empirical content of A, i.e.,
to use a phrase of Quine: tr(A) is to describe the difference the truth of A
would make to possible experience (cf. Quine 1969). For reasons of space,
we will not be able to offer an independent analysis of the notion of empiri-
cal content in this paper, but we will rather take ‘empirical content’ to be a
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primitive term here while simply presupposing that it is sufficiently under-
stood; hopefull, to some extent, what we have in mind should become clear
from the investigations below.3 Given the broad agreement among philoso-
phers of science that the truth of scientific theories may be underdetermined
empirically, sentences A and tr(A) may thus differ in truth value according
the new Aufbau even though their empirical contents are required to be the
same.4 Accordingly, A may not be replaced by tr(A) for all scientific pur-
poses whatsoever. Note that our new thesis does not presuppose any form
of verificationism according to which the meaning of a sentence is identified
with its empirical content. Moreover, since the translated sentences will
normally have truth conditions which differ from those of their translation
images, the translations in question should not be regarded as subserving
any sort of “ontological reduction” of physical objects to sense experience,
or the like.5
At second, the translation mappings we claim to exist are no longer
supposed to be definable by a system of explicit definitions alone. As we
are going to point out later, our translation will be partially based on con-
textual definitions, which is anticipated by Carnap in the Aufbau when he
accepts “definitions in use” as legitimate means of reduction by definition
(see also Quine 1969). Moreover, each of the explicit or contextual defini-
tions that we will propose is only meant to hold up to empirical equivalence;
as mentioned before, we do not demand coextensionality, necessary coexten-
sionality, or synonymy between defining and defined expressions. However,
our translation manual will still turn out to be a priori in the sense that it
is possible in principle to set it up before empirical investigation.
A further difference between the new thesis and its precursors consists
in our reference to mathematical signs as being additional to logical ones.
At the time of the Aufbau, Carnap still subscribed to logicism along the
lines of Frege and Russell. But logicism – at least in its traditional form –
does not work, and the denial of the existence of genuinely mathematical
concepts and sentences is no longer part of our “enlightened” programme.
In particular, we do not insist that the set-theoretic membership sign that
will be used later is a logical symbol.
As far as the empirical aspects of our translation mappings are con-
cerned, we have replaced the term ‘the given’ by ‘experience’: this indicates
that our new Aufbau system does not rely on any phenomenalistic concep-
tion of what the basis of our subjective experience consists in. In fact, the
new system will be open both to a phenomenalistic and a physicalistic in-
terpretation. Experiences may be the contents of particular mental states
or they may be particular mental states themselves; mental contents and
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mental states may turn out be identical to occurrences in the brain or to
brain states.
Finally, the goal of having the translations of scientific sentences express
subject-invariant constraints on experience is our substitute for the “struc-
tural” intentions of the original Aufbau, as highlighted by the second more
recent interpretation of the two interpretations considered above. In the
following, however, we we will not deal with this part of our new thesis, but
we will concentrate just on the rest of it.
Since every translation that preserves truth conditions may be assumed
to preserve empirical content as well, our new thesis is weaker than the two
“old” theses that we have discussed. But the new thesis is still reasonably
close to the old ones. When Carnap uses the term ‘necessary’ in the preface
of the second edition of the Aufbau in order to express the goal of the nec-
essary preservation of extension, he circumscribes this in the following way:
the extension of a defined expression within the phenomenalistic language
that is associated with a subject S should be identical to the extension of
its defining expression, independent of what the experience of S is like, as
long as S’s senses function “normally” and as long as “unfavourable circum-
stances” are excluded. As far as sentences are concerned, this is actually
very close to saying that tr(A) is to describe the difference the truth of A
would make to possible experience of S.
Before we turn to the problems notoriously affecting the old system and
to the details of a new Aufbau-like system, we want to point out very briefly
why the development of a new Aufbau is still a worthwhile epistemological
endeavour. In other words: Why should we care about a new “weakened”
Aufbau programme at all?
• It may cast new light on where and why the old Aufbau really failed:
We claim that each of the problems that have been ascribed to the orig-
inal Aufbau fall into one of three categories: (a) they do not even apply
to the original Aufbau (although they might apply to other aspects of
the Vienna circle philosophy) – these are the “pseudo-problems”; (b)
they did affect the Aufbau but they may be solved in a new system
by adapting the original construction in ways that are still acceptable
from the point of view of the old programme – these are the “feasible
problems”; (c) they did affect the Aufbau but they may be circum-
vented in the new system by lowering the intentions of the latter –
these are the “serious problems”. The construction of a new Aufbau
will give us some information on which problems of the old Aufbau
belong to the third, and philosophically most relevant, category. In
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particular: as we will see, what we call Goodman’s problems below
ought to count as feasible, while what we call Quine’s problem is seri-
ous.
• It may deepen our understanding of the empirical content of terms and
descriptive sentences: Although the meaning of an expression is not
identical with its empirical content, the latter is certainly one relevant
component of its meaning. Indeed, if experience is understood in terms
of a subjective basis that is relativized to a particular cognitive agent,
then the so-determined empirical meanings may be considered to be
among the internalist meaning components of linguistic expressions –
the meaning components that are “in” this agent’s mind – which are
additional to externalist (referential) ones.
• It may fill the gap between subjective experience and the intersub-
jective basis of scientific theories: After the protocol sentence debate
in the early 1930s, philosophers of science more or less decided to
conceive of the observational basis of science as being intersubjective
right from the start; observation terms and observation sentences were
meant to refer to observable real-world objects and to their observable
space-time properties. While this move is perfectly acceptable from
the viewpoint of philosophy of science, it leaves an interesting episte-
mological topic out of consideration: the relation of this intersubjec-
tive “observational” basis to the subjective act of observation and its
experiential content. The new Aufbau addresses this latter topic by
relocating empirical contents into the observer. In this way, given an
analysis of ‘experience’ in terms of q subjective basis for a cognitive
agent, it is possible to study what difference the truth or falsity of
a statement about common sense observable objects and properties
makes to an agent’s private experience.
• It may also relate questions in cognitive science and the philosophy of
cognition to questions in epistemology and philosophy of science; as
Glymour (1992), p. 367, puts it, “Carnap wrote the first artificial intel-
ligence program” when he introduced his phenomenalistic construction
system in the Aufbau. E.g., an answer to the question of whether the
empirical contents of scientific terms and sentences are generally com-
putable might be an interesting spin-off. Or: How parsimonious can
the expressive resources of a language be such that the empirical or
“experiential” contents of sentences, as being given by a subjective
basis, may still be expressed in it with sufficient accuracy?
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• Finally, a new Aufbau may refine our understanding and assessment
of structuralist claims: since the days of the Aufbau, structural re-
alism (cf. Worrall 1989) has evolved into a serious competitor for
an adequate description of scientific progress and its limits. As De-
mopoulos & Friedman (1985) have shown, some of the problems that
are claimed to affect present-day structural realism are among the dif-
ficulties that Carnap faced as well when he dealt with the reducibility
of scientific expressions to “structural descriptions” in the Aufbau (see
§11–16, 153–155).
It should have become clear by now that this is not a metaphysical
project but rather a semantic and epistemological one, with possible ap-
plications to the philosophy of science, the philosophy of language, and the
philosophy of cognition. Whether it can be carried out successfully, depends
on how it comes to terms with the well-known problems that affected the
“old” Aufbau. In the next section we are going to concentrate on two of
these problems which we refer to as ‘Goodman’s problems’. In order to ex-
plain the gist of Goodman’s problems, we have to start with an outline of
what is called the “basis” in the Aufbau.
3 The Basis of the “Old” Aufbau
Carnap’s Aufbau may be viewed as consisting of two parts: (a) the phenom-
enalistic constitution or construction system that is described in §106–155,
which is nothing but an extensive list of definitions, and (b) a philosophical
metatheory that analyzes, justifies, and applies this constitution system and
compares it to alternative ones. As every finite system of definitions, a con-
stitution system presupposes a choice of primitive, i.e., undefined terms; (i)
the set of interpretations of these terms together with (ii) the members of
the intended universe of discourse of the system are referred to as “the basis”
of the constitution system in the Aufbau. While (ii) constitute the “basic
elements” of the system, (i) gets referred to as its “basic properties and
relations”; we call the corresponding predicates that express the basic prop-
erties and relations “basic predicates”. In the case of the phenomenalistic
constitution system of the Aufbau, this basis is, of course, phenomenalistic:
it consists of
• (Old) Basic elements: elementary experiences (erlebs) of a given and
fixed subject S within a given interval of time;
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• (Old) Basic relations: the membership relation ∈ and the relation Er
of “recollected similarity”.
The intended universe and the intended interpretation of the basic terms
of the phenomenalistic constitution system in the Aufbau can be explained
extra-systematically:
An elementary experience or erleb (this is Goodman’s term in The Struc-
ture of Appearance, 1951) of a subject S within an interval of time is a total
momentary slice through S’s stream of experience, i.e., the sum of all visual,
auditory, tactile,. . . experiences that S has at a subjectively experienced
moment of time, where the moment is assumed to be included in the given
interval of time.
The membership relation is just the standard mathematical relation that
holds between the members of a set and the set itself. The underlying set
theory of the Aufbau was actually a version of simple type theory in which
‘∈’ was not really primitive but rather contextually eliminable in favour of
higher-order quantification. However, for our purposes it is more convenient
to consider the set theoretical system of the Aufbau as a version of modern
set theory with a given universe of urelements. The urelements are just the
basic elements as described above, i.e., elementary experiences.6
‘Er’ is a binary predicate that expresses a relation between erlebs: it is
the case that xEr y if and only if x is recollected by S as being part-similar
to y. E.g., if S experiences in x a particular light-red spot in the left-upper
part of her visual field and if a little later S has an elementary experience
y in which she experiences a dark-red spot in the left-middle part of her
visual field, then x and y have “parts” that are similar to each other; this is
what S is aware of, if x stands in the Er-relation to y. We can express this
more formally by presupposing – as Carnap does – that every elementary
experience can be described by reference to pairwise disjoint quality spaces
which come equipped with distance functions (metrics). Indeed, these qual-
ity spaces may be regarded as mathematical entities which get realized or
instantiated when S has experiences of some sort, and Carnap’s basis can
be explained by exploiting this correspondence to a mathematical structure.
E.g., instead of saying that S experiences in x a particular light-red spot
in the left-upper part of her visual field, we may say equivalently that the
erleb x realizes a particular point in the “light-red and left-upper” region of
S’s visual quality space, if only this “realization” or “instantiation” relation
is explained in a way such that the equivalence between the two statements
holds by definition.7 The part-similarity of x and y then corresponds to
the fact that there are quality points p, q in a single sensory quality space
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(visual, auditory, tactile,. . . ) – in this example the visual one – such that (i)
p and q are metrically “close” to each other, i.e., they have a distance that is
less than or equal to some given and fixed real number , and (ii) x realizes
p while y realizes q. In the case of the visual quality space, the closeness of
p and q amounts to the fact that p and q represent colours-at-places where
the colours resemble each other, and where the places resemble each other,
too. If the part-similarity of two erlebs x and y is recollected by S in the
sense that S compares a memory image of the past erleb x with her current
erleb y, then this is precisely what gets expressed by ‘xEr y’. Er thus has
a qualitative and a temporal component. In particular, if xEr y, then the
erleb x occurred before y.8
4 Problem Set 1: Goodman’s Problems
Carnap’s main goal in the first part of his constitution system – the so-called
“auto-psychological domain” (§106–122) – is to show that the meager basis
of this system suffices for the definition of various kinds of terms by which
one may express and analyze S’s experiences qualitatively. In particular,
Carnap wants to define a general term ‘phenomenal quality point’9 the ex-
tension of which should be the set of phenomenal counterparts of visual,
auditory, tactile,. . . quality points as described above. While the quality
points are just points in some mathematical spaces that come associated
with sense modalities, the phenomenal counterparts to these quality points
– call them phenomenal quality points – are set-theoretic constructs on er-
lebs: a quality point p is meant to induce a phenomenal quality point in the
sense that the latter is the set of all erlebs in which p is realized. The set
of phenomenal quality points is therefore the class of all sets of erlebs which
are induced in this way. However, while this is the intended interpretation
of the predicate ‘phenomenal quality point’, Carnap has to show that its
extension may be defined, whether directly or indirectly, solely in terms of
the basic relations ∈ and Er. The way in which he tries to accomplish this
is, roughly, (i) by defining a similarity relation Sim of erlebs as the reflex-
ive symmetric closure of Er, (ii) by abstracting from Sim the phenomenal
counterparts of spheres in quality spaces (call them phenomenal spheres),
and finally (iii) by defining the members of the extension of ‘phenomenal
quality point’ in terms of these phenomenal spheres. Step (i) is intended to
have the result that xSimy if and only if x and y realize quality points in
a common closed quality sphere of diameter , i.e., x and y realize quality
points that have a distance less than or equal to .10 The steps (ii) and (iii)
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constitute Carnap’s method of quasianalysis, a method of abstraction that
generalizes Frege’s and Russell’s method of abstracting equivalence classes
from equivalence relations. Phenomenal spheres are thus supposed to have a
mediating role between erlebs and phenomenal quality points. Analogously
to the case of phenomenal quality points, a quality sphere Q is meant to in-
duce a phenomenal quality sphere in the sense that the latter should be the
set of all erlebs which realize some quality point in Q. The set of phenome-
nal quality spheres is then the class of all sets of erlebs which are induced in
this way. The first part of quasianalysis is intended to define the extension
of ‘phenomenal quality sphere’ to be this class, where the definition is to be
spelled out solely in terms of ‘∈’ and ‘Er’.
After having defined ‘phenomenal quality point’, Carnap’s strategy is to
introduce a definition of a new similarity relation which is defined on the ba-
sis of the similarity relation for erlebs but which applies to the newly defined
phenomenal quality points. He is especially interested in the connectivity
components of this new similarity relation: these components are expected
to be exactly the phenomenal counterparts of quality spaces, because if S
has experiences which are sufficiently varied it is likely that phenomenal
quality points which correspond to visual quality points are never quali-
tative “neighbours” of, say, phenomenal quality points that correspond to
auditory quality points. Carnap then shows how “dimension numbers” may
be assigned to the connectivity components, which seems to be possible
because he assumes that every subjective quality space has a well-defined
dimensionality. In particular, the visual quality space is supposed to be the
only five-dimensional quality space: a five-dimensional subset of the Eu-
clidean space R5, where the first two coordinates correspond to the x- and
the y-coordinates of places in the two-dimensional visual field, and where
the other three coordinates represent the hue, brightness, and saturation of
the colour spots that sit at these places. Every colour-at-a-place thus corre-
sponds to a unique quality point in a five-dimensional space that is usually
depicted as a cone-like mathematical object (the “colour cone”). Accord-
ingly for all other sense classes – e.g., the auditory quality space may be
assumed to be a two-dimensional subset of R2, and so forth. In this way,
Carnap would be able to identify the visual sense modality by its dimension,
such that on this basis he could define the phenomenal counterpart of the
visual quality space as well as the counterparts of all the other quality spaces
that are associated with the remaining sense classes.
Unfortunately, this strategy of defining phenomenal quality points and
distinguishing phenomenal quality spaces is affected by two serious short-
comings. As Goodman (1951, 1963, 1971) has shown,
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• Carnap’s method of abstracting phenomenal quality spheres and phe-
nomenal quality points from a relation of similarity for erlebs is defi-
cient;
• Carnap’s method of determining the visual phenomenal quality space
by dimensional analysis fails if the set of erlebs is of finite cardinality.
We will now deal with these two problems in more detail. We focus first
on quasianalysis: By definition, Sim is a reflexive and symmetric relation on
the given set of elementary experiences. If X is a set of erlebs, let X be called
a clique with respect to Sim if and only if for all x, y ∈ X: xSimy. Here is
the main idea of the first step of quasianalysis: consider some set X of erlebs
which realize a quality point within a fixed quality sphere Q of diameter ,
i.e., of radius 2 .
11 E.g., Q might be the set of visual quality points that have
distance 2 or less from the quality point that represents a particular tone
of red located at a particular spot in the visual field. X will certainly be
a clique with respect to similarity, since every two members of X are part-
similar; this is because every two members of X realize points of Q and thus
points which are metrically close, i.e., which have a distance that is less than
or equal to  from each other. Let X ′ now be a superset of X, such that every
erleb in X ′ still realizes some quality point in Q: then X ′ is again a clique
with respect to Sim and thus X ′ is a clique that is larger than X. X ′ seems
to be a better approximation of the phenomenal counterpart of Q than X
was. Accordingly, Carnap suggests to define the phenomenal counterparts
of quality spheres to be maximal cliques with respect to Sim, where X is a
maximal clique with respect to Sim if and only if X is a clique with respect
to Sim and there is no set Y of erlebs, such that X & Y , and Y is also a
clique with respect to Sim. However, this method does not work in each
and every case: sometimes the intended phenomenal quality spheres are not
introduced by quasianalysis, since they cannot be separated with respect to
the similarities that they induce – Goodman calls this the “companionship
difficulty” – or they are introduced unjustifiedly because several erlebs are
pairwise similar without there being a single quality sphere in which all of
them realize a point – this is referred to by Goodman as the “difficulty of
imperfect community”.
Here in an example of imperfect community (many more examples can
be found in Leitgeb 2007, together with a detailed analysis of the problems
and merits of Carnap’s quasianalysis):
Example 1 (Imperfect Community)
For a given set of six erlebs 1, . . . , 6, let us assume: 1, 2, 4 realize a quality
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point in a sphere Q1 (and no other erleb does), 2, 3, 5 realize a quality point
in a sphere Q2 (and no other erleb does), and 4, 5, 6 realize a quality point
in a sphere Q3 (while no other erleb does), and we suppose again that these
are all spheres in which points are realized. So the phenomenal counterparts
of quality spheres are:
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The graph that depicts the similarity relation which corresponds to this
distribution of realized quality spheres is:
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If the first step of quasianalysis is applied, a “new” triangle {2, 4, 5} is de-
fined to be a member of the extension of ‘phenomenal quality sphere’ because
{2, 4, 5} is a maximal clique with respect to similarity. However, {2, 4, 5} is
not the phenomenal counterpart of any of the actual quality spheres. 2, 4, 5
are indeed pairwise similar, but in each case for a different “reason”. As
Goodman expresses this type of problem, they form an “imperfect commu-
nity”.
As we have just seen, the first step of quasianalysis in the Aufbau may
fail. But let us assume for the moment that the set of maximal cliques with
respect to Sim would indeed coincide with all and only the phenomenal
counterparts of quality spheres: how could the set of phenomenal counter-
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parts of quality points be defined in terms of the latter? As a first approx-
imation, Carnap discusses the possibility of defining phenomenal quality
points as maximal non-empty intersections of phenomenal spheres, just as
quality points correspond bijectively to maximal non-empty intersections of
quality spheres. However, this method of defining phenomenal points on
the basis of phenomenal spheres will not do, because there may be maximal
non-empty intersections of phenomenal spheres which do not coincide with
any phenomenal point: Carnap refers to this as the problem of “accidental
intersection” (§80–81 in the Aufbau). The difficulty is that an erleb may
realize points in many different quality spheres at the same time; therefore,
the phenomenal counterparts of two quality spheres might either intersect
because the two quality spheres themselves have a non-empty intersection in
the quality space and this gets reflected by their phenomenal counterparts
– the unproblematic case – or a single erleb realizes points in two quality
spheres although the two spheres do not intersect – this is the case where
the corresponding phenomenal quality spheres intersect “accidentally”. In
order to overcome this difficulty, Carnap includes a quantitative condition
which essentially says (simplifying just a bit): look for maximal intersections
of phenomenal spheres by taking intersections in a step-by-step manner, but
do only take an intersection step if the set-theoretic overlapping of a phe-
nomenal sphere with the previously generated intersection is not “too small”
compared with the number of elements of the previous intersection. This
constitutes the second step of quasianalysis. As Goodman and others have
shown, even this more elaborate method does not avoid accidental intersec-
tions and hence does not always give the intended results.
Carnap himself was aware of these problems. The reason that he was
not worried about them is that he regarded the situations in which these
problems do occur as exceptional (Moulines 1991 argues in a similar man-
ner). As we show in Leitgeb (2007), the problems are in fact serious: it
is extremely likely that a cognitive agent such as our given subject S has
experiences of a kind that lead to extensions of ‘phenomenal quality sphere’
and ‘phenomenal quality point’ which differ significantly from the actually
intended sets of phenomenal quality spheres and phenomenal quality points.
Moreover, in the extreme case of “varied experience” in which the formal
structure of Carnap’s basis actually coincides with the formal structure of
the mathematical entities that it corresponds to, the problems do in fact
not vanish. So Goodman was right after all, even though it needs more
elaborate formal investigations into the problem in order to see that this is
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actually so.
So we can turn to the second of Goodman’s problems – the dimensional-
ity problem. When Carnap defines the dimension of his phenomenal quality
spaces, i.e., of the connectivity components of the similarity relation for phe-
nomenal quality points, he relies on Menger’s classic topological definition
of dimension for topological spaces or on a variant of it (§115–119).12 The
similarity relation functions as a “neighbourhood” relation on the phenom-
enal quality points, which is all that is needed in order to define a topology
on its connectivity components. What Carnap overlooked when doing so,
but what Goodman did observe, was that every finite topological space is in
fact zero-dimensional (where we call a topological space ‘finite’ if and only
if its underlying point set is finite). But Carnap assumes explicitly that the
given set of erlebs is finite, as he points out in §180 of the Aufbau. Hence also
the set of phenomenal quality points, which are nothing but sets of erlebs,
is finite. Therefore, every phenomenal quality space, including the visual
phenomenal quality space, is actually zero-dimensional, and Carnap’s plan
of identifying the visual sense class by its dimension fails.
One way of avoiding this problem would be to give up the presumption
that the set of erlebs is finite. However, the resulting constitution system
would be dubious from a phenomenalistic point of view: in a phenomenalistic
system, the subject should in principle have cognitive access to the basic
elements of the system; if there are infinitely many basic elements, this does
not seem to be possible, at least if simultaneous access to the basic elements
is needed. The situation would change if a system were set up which were
meant to have a physicalistic (but still epistemic) interpretation instead: just
as a mechanical system may have infinitely many possible states, the set of
possible contents or states of experience for a subject, or neural system, S
might be infinite. If such a set were chosen to be the set of basic elements
of a physicalistic constitution system, Carnap’s original strategy might be
put to work.
In our new Aufbau, we will follow a different line of reasoning. As men-
tioned before, our system will be open to a phenomenalistic and to a phys-
icalistic interpretation. Accordingly, we are going to leave open what the
cardinality of the set of basic elements is like. Since we will nevertheless
take up Carnap’s idea of characterizing phenomenal quality spaces in terms
of their dimension, we will have to show how dimension numbers may be
assigned to them, independently of whether there are finitely or infinitely
many basic elements. We will suggest a solution to this problem, as well as
a solution to Goodman’s first problem, in section 7.
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In the next section we are going to turn to another notorious difficulty
that has been ascribed to Carnap’s Aufbau: the problem of holism and the
non-definability of theoretical terms.
5 Problem Set 2: Quine’s Problem
After having introduced phenomenal quality points, the similarity relation
for them, and the different phenomenal quality spaces, several other def-
initions in the Aufbau system just fall into place: e.g., Carnap is able to
define the set of phenomenal colour qualities, which is a set of sets of visual
quality classes; the set of places in the visual field; a neighbourhood relation
for these places; the set of visual sensations, where the latter are ordered
pairs 〈x,X〉 of an erleb x and a visual phenomenal quality point X, such
that X occurs within x, i.e., x ∈ X. Moreover, the transitive closure of the
given basic relation Er can be used as a “preliminary time order” for erlebs.
Indirectly, Carnap is thus able to define phrases such as ‘x is the place of
the visual sensation y’, ‘x is the phenomenal colour quality of the visual sen-
sation y’, ‘visual sensation x occurs before visual sensation y’, and so forth.
All of these definitions deal solely with the auto-psychological domain.
Carnap’s first attempt to link experiences to physical properties – or
rather to the phenomenal counterparts thereof – was his “definition” of
the function col which is to assign phenomenal colour qualities to points of
four-dimensional space-time. The idea was to project the phenomenal colour
qualities that occur in visual sensations “outwards”, i.e., to map phenomenal
colour qualities – along lines of sight that originate in places of the visual field
– to points in R4. This should be done in a way, such that (i) the temporal
and neighbourhood relations between visual sensations are respected, (ii)
the phenomenal colour qualities “travel” on segments of continuous world-
lines through space-time, and (iii) certain maxims of intertness are satisfied:
the colours on world-lines should change as slowly as possible, the curvature
of their world-lines should be as small as possible, the colours should move
along world-lines as slowly as possible, world-lines should preserve their
spatial distances as much as possible, and the like.
However, in contrast to the very precise and detailed exposition of the
definitions in the auto-psychological domain, Carnap does not state an ex-
plicit definition of the colour assignment col in terms of ∈, Er, and the
already defined terms, but leaves the issue with a general outline of the
desiderata. It might seem that this is just a matter of abridgement rather
than a problem that affects the transition from the autopsychological to the
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physical domain fundamentally. Quine (1951) famously thought otherwise:
Carnap did not seem to recognize. . . that his treatment of physical
objects fell short of reduction not merely through sketchiness, but in
principle. Statements of the form ‘Quality q is at point-instant x; y; z; t’
were, according to [Carnap’s] canons, to be apportioned truth values in
such a way as to maximize and minimize certain over-all features. . . I
think this is a good schematization. . . of what science really does; but
it provides no indication. . . of how a statement of the form ‘Quality q is
at point-instant x; y; z; t’ could ever be translated into Carnap’s initial
language of sense data and logic. The connective ‘is at’ remains an
added undefined connective; the canons counsel us in its use but not
in its elimination.
According to Quine, it is not a mere coincidence that Carnap did not
spell out an explicit definition of the colour mapping: he simply could not
have done so. While from the viewpoint of later philosophy of science, ‘col’
would maybe count as a basic observational term that was not even in need
of a definition, within a system such as the Aufbau ‘col’ is the first instance
of a theoretical term. That is: it is theoretical relative to the extremely
parsimonious basis of the Aufbau. Its extension is pinned down in terms of a
little theory which consists of certain principles or maxims that contain the
basic terms ∈ and Er as well as ‘col’ itself. If all terms that are theoretical
with respect to the basis of the Aufbau turned out to be definable just
in terms of ∈ and Er alone (apart from logical expressions), then these
theoretical terms would have a meaning of their own that could be conveyed
through primitive experiential or logico-mathematical terms. Accordingly,
all sentences which would involve terms such as col would have a content
of their own. This is precisely what Quine denies: only whole theories
have content and only theories as wholes can be empirically confirmed or
disconfirmed. This is Quine’s doctrine of holism: meaning holism on the
one hand and confirmational holism on the other.13 In a nutshell: the
transition from concepts for sense experience to concepts for the physical
domain involves theoretical terms which cannot be defined in terms of the
given experiential basis.14 In section 8 we will see how this problem can be
approached in new Aufbau-like setting. The next section is devoted to the
basis of the “new” Aufbau.
6 The Basis of the New Aufbau
In some sense, it is not so surprising that Carnap’s phenomenalistic consti-
tution system is affected by the problems that were outlined by Goodman.
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Carnap’s basis is minimalistic, indeed too minimalistic: (i) Er is weak: since
the similarity of erlebs is a notion of part-similarity, too many erlebs may
turn out to be (part-)similar to too many other erlebs. E.g., a single com-
mon red spot on a particular location in the visual field suffices to let two
erlebs come out to be similar. (ii) Er does not allow for “respects of sim-
ilarity”: there is no way of distinguishing cases in which two erlebs x and
x′ are similar in the very same respect in which two further erlebs y and
y′ are similar, from cases in which this is not so. (iii) Er does not support
“gradations” of similarity: the similarity of an erleb x to an erleb y is an
all-or-nothing affair; a comparative notion of resemblance would be more
fine-grained and perhaps more plausible from a phenomalistic point of view.
Thus, the first step of avoiding Goodman’s problems is to change the
basis of the system. However, the solution is not just, say, to presuppose
a primitive ternary relation of similarity of the form ‘x is similar to y in a
respect in which z is neither similar to x nor to y’ (Eberle 1975 has sug-
gested this as a solution to Goodman’s problem). The main reason for the
problems that affect quasianalysis is neither a flaw in the method nor the
restriction to binary similarity, but rather that the content of information
that is coded by a set of phenomenal quality spheres or by a set of phe-
nomenal quality points simply cannot be coded by a similarity relation of
erlebs with fixed finite arity (see Leitgeb 2007). This does not entail that the
constitution of phenomenal quality spheres or quality points from similarity
is absolutely impossible: if similarity is e.g. assumed to be a relation which
is both “contrastive” and has variable finite or infinite arity, a substitute
of quasianalysis can be found that is always adequate (this was suggested
by Lewis 1983). Alternatively, if the domains of similarity structures are
extended beyond the original domain of erlebs and if at the same time a
numerical concept of similarity is used, phenomenal qualities can be consti-
tuted again (see Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002). Of course, none of these options
tells us anything about how to approach Goodman’s second problem.
The basic relations that we are going to presuppose in our new system
are qualitative and still of fixed arity.15 None of our basic relations is a
similarity relation; instead, similarity will be defined later in terms of the
new basis:
• (New) Basic elements: experiential tropes instantiated by the erlebs
of a given and fixed subject S within a given interval of time;16
• (New) Basic relations: the membership relation ∈, the temporal “be-
fore” relation <, and the relation Ov of “qualitative overlap”.
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Our new basic elements are tropes, i.e., property bits or property in-
stances, which in our case we take to have an extended temporal “location”
(see Mellor&Oliver 1997 for a collection of classic articles on tropes). A
standard example of a trope would be the red of the pencil that has been
right in front of me for the last three seconds. Our basic elements, however,
are property bits which are exemplified by erlebs rather than physical enti-
ties; so an example would be more like the red-colour-range in the left-upper
part of my visual field that has been instantiated by my last few erlebs. Note
that erlebs themselves are not among the basic elements of our system; we
only refer to them when we explain extra-systematically what the variables
of the statements of our new constitution system are intended to range over.
Just as Carnap’s erlebs correspond formally to sets of quality points
– the sets of quality points that they realize – we assume our new basic
elements to correspond formally to pairs 〈Cq, Ct〉 where (i) Cq is a bounded,
extended, closed convex17 set of quality points in a sensory quality space
(visual, auditory, tactile,. . . ), (ii) Ct is a bounded, extended, closed convex
set of temporal instants on the real “time” axis, i.e., a compact interval
of finite length, and (iii) there is an erleb of S which instantiates some
quality point in Cq within the interval Ct. We will return to this formal
representation below. Except for stating these necessary conditions, we leave
open which pairs 〈Cq, Ct〉 among those that satisfy (i), (ii), (iii) actually do
correspond to our basic elements, but it is clear that the more basic elements
there are in our intended universe of discourse, and the more varied their
temporal and qualitative relationships, the more the formal structure of our
set of basic elements will approximate the formal structure of the set of all
pairs 〈Cq, Ct〉 of convex sets with the described properties. In any case,
we want to emphasize that the basic elements of our new system are not
convex sets of points in a Euclidean space themselves but only that they
can represented as such, such as locations on the surface of the earth can be
represented by purely mathematical entities without coinciding with them.
∈ is of course again the set-theoretic membership relation. We use some
standard first-order set theory (say, of the strength of ZFC) with urelements,
where the urelements are our basic elements. This project is by no means
a nominalistic one, and neither was its predecessor; standard mathematical
resources are indeed crucial for its execution.
‘<’ is a binary predicate which expresses a relation of basic elements,
such that x < y if and only if x occurs “completely” before y, where ‘com-
pletely’ is meant to imply that x and y do not overlap temporally. According
to the intended formal representation of our basic elements, if x is repre-
sented by 〈C1q , C1t 〉 and y is represented by 〈C2q , C2t 〉, then x stands in the
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<-relation to y if and only if every member of C1t is before every member
of C2t (which implies that C
1
t ∩ C2t = ∅). Although our basic elements cor-
respond temporally to compact intervals of R and thus to subsets of what
is usually regarded as the formal model of physical time, one should not
mix up < with the order relation of real numbers. The latter holds between
points in a non-denumerable continuum; the former is a relation of possibly
finitely many experiential tropes that have a temporal extension.
The intended interpretation of the primitive term Ov can also be ex-
plained extra-systematically: ‘Ov’ is a unary predicate that applies to sets
X of basic elements. It is the case that Ov(X) if and only if the members of
X have a common qualitative overlap. In terms of the formal model that we
have introduced above, if X = {Yi : i ∈ I} and if each Yi is represented by
〈Ciq, Cit〉, then Ov(X) if and only if
⋂
i∈I C
i
q 6= ∅. Note that the overlap of
two basic elements x and y is a special case of our general overlap relation,
since binary overlap can be expressed easily by ‘Ov({x, y})’. Accordingly,
although ‘Ov’ is a unary predicate, we will often speak of Ov as an over-
lap relation, because it can be viewed as a relation that holds between the
members of every set to which it applies.
Let us compare this new basis with Carnap’s in the Aufbau and with
Goodman’s in his The Structure of Appearance (Goodman 1951). Carnap’s
idea was to start from erlebs and to define phenomenal quality spheres as
an intermediate step in order to be able ultimately to state his intended
definition of phenomenal quality points. Goodman’s basic elements corre-
spond roughly to Carnap’s phenomenal quality points; his basic relations,
which hold for these phenomenal quality points, are chosen in a way that
makes it easy for him to compose complex phenomenal entities from the
given atomic phenomenal units.18 Finally, the basic elements of our new
system are on a level of abstraction that corresponds to the level of phe-
nomenal quality spheres: they are neither total momentary slices through
S’s stream of experience nor can they be regarded as “point-like” qualities,
but they rather lie somewhere in between. In some respects, they resemble
what Whitehead (see Gru¨nbaum 1953 for an overview) and Russell (1954,
1961) referred to as extended “events”.19 From a phenomenalistic point of
view, it is questionable whether “point-like” basic elements are subjectively
accessible; points seem more likely to be abstractions from extended basic
elements which are more easily accessible for a cognitive being, which might
be an attractive feature of our new basis.
While Carnap’s basic objects are concrete entities and Goodman’s basic
elements are abstract ones, the basic elements of our system share properties
with both of them: like the former they can only occur within particular
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intervals of time; just as the latter they are instantiated in the same way
as properties or types are instantiated by their bearers or tokens. It is a
matter of terminology of whether our basic elements should thus be called
‘concrete’ or ‘abstract’. Either way the basic elements that we presuppose
are actual entities, i.e., our set of basic objects is not meant to include mere
possibilia.
Here are some further remarks on the choice of our basis:
– Are we relying too much on the “metaphysics of tropes” here in order
for this to be a “properly” Carnapian project? Not really. It is clear that
every choice of a basis amounts to laying down an ontology for its corre-
sponding constitution system; in this case, it is an ontology of experiential
tropes and sets thereof, and three basic relations. But of course we do not
claim in any sense that this is the “only” ontology to use, or the “right” one,
or the “most fundamental one”, or the like, which would be truly against the
Carnapian spirit. Hopefully, our basis is just one that serves our purposes.
– Why demand that our basic elements correspond to pairs of convex
sets? Convex sets have been suggested by Ga¨rdenfors (1990, 2000) as plau-
sible candidates for “natural” regions in quality spaces, i.e., the qualita-
tive representations of “natural kinds” or “natural properties”. Ga¨rdenfors
presents several arguments in favour of this suggestion: The quality space
interpretations of classical examples of non-projectible predicates such as
‘grue’ (Goodman’s new riddle) or ‘non-black’ (Hempel’s paradox) are non-
convex sets, in contrast with ‘green’ or colour predicates in general. Convex
sets are not closed under complement and union, but the intersection of two
convex sets in the same quality space is again a convex set; natural proper-
ties seem to obey the same closure conditions. While a bounded convex set
can be ascribed a “center of gravity” which might be regarded as a proto-
type that corresponds to it, non-convex sets do not have this property; so
convex sets subserve prototype representations. There is one further feature
of convex sets that we want to add to Ga¨rdenfors’ list and which is of par-
ticular relevance in the context of the Aufbau: convex sets may be regarded
as respects of similarity – if p is similar to r in a particular respect (say,
Q) and q is qualitatively between p and r, then it seems to be necessary
that p and r are similar to q in the same respect Q. But this is just the
closure condition for convex sets, whence convex sets seem to be plausible
candidates for qualitative respects of similarity.
– We do not assume that the subject S perceives basic elements; in fact,
we regard the old “sense data” theory of perception as false. What we
presuppose is that while S perceives physical objects and their properties,
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she has certain experiences. Sentences which involve our basic predicates
may be used to describe which sense experiences S has. These descriptions
of S’s experience in terms of basic predicates are not necessarily S’s “first-
person” descriptions, but they might just as well be a neuroscientist’s “third-
person” descriptions. S is not assumed to be consciously aware of her sense
experiences either, i.e., our basis is open to the existence of unconscious
sense experience.
– Since the basis of our system – and the same holds for Carnap’s –
involves at the same time basic elements and basic relations, the basis is,
in a sense, propositional from the start. It is a given that some set of basic
elements has non-empty qualitative overlap or that one basic element occurs
before another one does; what is given here is of propositional form. The
sentences that can be formed in our restricted first-order language on the
basis of ‘∈’, ‘<’, and ‘Ov’, are meant to express these “given” propositions.
But we do not subscribe to any sort of epistemological foundationalism: sen-
tences involving our basic terms are not necessarily certain or self-justifying;
S might think that they are true or we might think that they are true but
in fact they are false. As far as their justification is concerned, their status
might differ only gradually from the status of sentences about the physical
world. It is not even our primary goal to justify sentences about the physical
world on the basis of sentences that can be formulated in the language of
our new constitution system. The latter may indeed play some role in the
analysis of empirical confirmation, but it is not obvious what this role actu-
ally consists in. In particular, empirical equivalence should not be mixed up
with evidential equivalence, neither in the case where ‘empirical equivalence’
is explained in terms of a physical basis nor if it is understood in terms of a
subjective basis: if A and tr(A) are empirically equivalent, this does not by
itself entail that whatever counts as evidence in favour of A is also evidence
for tr(A) and vice versa (see the discussion in Ladyman 2002). It should be
kept in mind that it is even questionable whether Carnap’s original Aufbau
programme was a foundationalist one. The proponents of what we called
the second interpretation of the Aufbau put forward very good arguments
that it was not. In any case, nothing like Sellars’ “myth of the given” applies
to our new “Aufbau-like” system.
– We are not committed to any particular way in which < and Ov are
caused to hold between basic elements. It is clear that what S perceives is to
play a role, but if some of S’s theoretical beliefs also do so, this is fine with
the new system. Our choice of basic elements and basic relations reflects
the choice of a level on which S’s experiences are described. We leave open
to what extent these experiences are causally influenced by external input
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and to what extent they are shaped by internal mechanisms. What we call
‘experience’ is simply whatever is to be found on our chosen level of S’s
cognitive “life”.
– The basis of our system has both an “enlightened” phenomalistic in-
terpretation (as Carnap’s in the old Aufbau) and a subjective physicalistic
interpretation (as Quine’s envisioned naturalization of the Aufbau in Quine
1969, 1993, 1995). We say ‘enlightened’ because of what we have pointed
out above concerning sense data perception and epistemological foundation-
alism. One physicalistic way of viewing our basic elements is to think of
them in terms of neural activation patterns of perceptual detector units: a
pattern that corresponds formally to a pair 〈Cq, Ct〉 is generated by a detec-
tor if and only if an external stimulus is detected that overlaps qualitatively
with the range Cq while overlapping temporally with the range Ct. Even if
such a physicalistic interpretation is adopted, the basis is still subjective in
the sense that the basic elements and the basic relations make up a subject
S’s experience. It is just that experience is now conceived from a natural-
istic point of view. Carnap himself mentioned in the Aufbau the possibility
of constitution systems other than the phenomenalistic system that he had
chosen to work out in detail.
– It can be shown that the unary basic predicate ‘Ov’, which applies
to sets of basic elements, could be replaced by a sevenary overlap relation
of basic elements. Thus, we do not really rely on the fact that Ov applies
to sets, although this choice is convenient from an expositional point of
view. It may also be shown that no overlap predicate of lower arity could
be employed if the definitions that we are going to introduce below are to
be preserved.20
– The empirical contents of sentences, which we want to preserve by our
translation mapping tr, will only be given relative to our choice of basic
elements and basic relations; ‘empirical content’ in our sense is short for
‘empirical content relative to the basis . . . ’, where ‘. . . ’ is to be replaced by
a description of our new basis. But of course there are other possible choices
concerning basic elements and basic relations. Our basis might actually be
constituted in terms of the basis of a different system, just as Carnap’s basis
turns out to be reconstructible in our own system. It might even be the case
that the basic elements and basic relations of two systems are in some sense
interdefinable. A basis with more primitive relations might correspond to a
more fine-grained notion of empirical content, but perhaps the rather eco-
nomical basis that we have chosen suffices in order to express the empirical
contents of sentences in a non-trivial and satisfying way. Furthermore, the
choice of a basis is always guided by extra-systematic empirical considera-
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tions on the system that would be determined by the basis. E.g., Carnap’s
choice was clearly motivated, and to some extent justified, by Gestalt theo-
ries of perception. Our own choice is inspired and – hopefully – also some-
what justified by theories in cognitive science, such as Ga¨rdenfors’ theory of
natural regions in conceptual spaces, although we cannot say much about
these background theories in this paper. However, it should be clear that
every attempt of rational reconstruction such as Carnap’s or the present
one presupposes some amount of idealization. In this respect, it is help-
ful to think of the given subject S not as a human being but rather as an
artificial cognitive agent. E.g.: If it turns out empirically that the visual
space of humans cannot be considered as a five-dimensional quality space,
then we might still assume our artificial subject S to have a visual space of
the intended kind. We would then argue that if the empirical contents of
scientific sentences relative to such an artificial agent can be analyzed within
our constitution system, something similar might be achieved for an actual
human agent on the basis of a sufficiently adapted system.
7 How to Solve Goodman’s Problems
We are now going to introduce a sequence of definitions which is a part of
our new constitution system. As explained at the beginning, the idea behind
such a system of definitions in this context is that it determines a correspond-
ing translation mapping for sentences. The final goal of the definitions in
this section is to have a procedure at hand by which sentences about phe-
nomenal quality points and their temporal and qualitative relations can be
turned into sentences that are formulated just on the basis of ‘∈’, ‘<’, and
‘Ov’. The strategy by which we want to approach Goodman’s problems will
be to consider first the dimensionality problem and only then the problem of
defining phenomenal quality points. The change of basis, together with the
change of the definitional procedure, will enable us to avoid the difficulties of
companionship, imperfect community, accidental intersection, and collapse
of dimensionality.
We start with the definition of ‘set of basic elements’, or briefly, ‘Bas’.
The members of the members of the extension of ‘Ov’ are definitely basic
elements. Moreover, for every basic element x the set {x} is certainly a
member of the extension of ‘Ov’, because x has non-empty overlap with
itself. Therefore, the following definition, by which all and only the members
of the members of Ov are collected together, assigns the intended extension
to ‘Bas’:
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• Constitution of set of basic elements:
Bas =df
⋃
Ov.
Now we are going to make use of our basic relation <. At first, we can
define a binary relation of temporal overlap for basic elements:
• Constitution of temporal overlap:
Ovtemp(x, y)↔df (i) x, y ∈ Bas, (ii) x 6< y and y 6< x.
This definition is justified in view of the fact that if a basic element x
is neither totally before another basic element y nor totally after it – where
the after-relation is just the converse of the before-relation – then x and y
must overlap temporally. The reason why we did not start outright with a
basic relation of temporal overlap is that subjective time does not only have
an overlap structure – as the qualitative spaces have – but also an order
structure, which we are going to exploit below.
Once we have temporal overlap, we can define time instants and a be-
tweenness and order relation on them. Time instants are simply defined as
maximal sets of basic elements that have pairwise overlap. The definition
is related to Carnap’s system in two respects: time instants have the same
function in our system as the (then primitive) erlebs did in the original
Aufbau; they include all instances of experience at a time. Secondly, our
definition of time instants follows Carnap’s strategy of defining phenomenal
spheres, i.e., the first part of quasianalysis. Does the definition thus fall
prey to the same shortcomings? No – in our case, every basic element cor-
responds temporally to a compact (i.e., bounded and closed) real interval.
It can be shown that if every two intervals of a set of compact intervals
have non-empty intersection, then the members of the set have a joint non-
empty intersection.21 The definition of betweenness below is unproblematic
because our basic elements correspond formally to convex sets, which are
by definition closed under betweenness. The definition of temporal order for
time instants is simply the result of lifting our basic relation < to the next
higher level of abstraction. So we define:
• Constitution of time instant (or erleb):
x is a time instant ↔df
(i) x ⊆ Bas, (ii) for all y, z ∈ x : Ovtemp(y, z),
(iii) there is no x′ ⊆ Bas, s.t. x $ x′ and for all y, z ∈ x′ Ovtemp(y, z).
Let Ptemp =df {x|x is a time instant}.
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• For all a ∈ Bas, x ∈ Ptemp:
a is at time x↔df a ∈ x.
• Constitution of betweenness of time instants:
For all x, y, z ∈ Ptemp:
Btemp(x, y, z)↔df
for all a ∈ Bas: if a is at x and a is at z, then a is at y.
• Constitution of order of time instants:
For all x, y ∈ Ptemp:
x <temp y ↔df there are x′ ∈ x, y′ ∈ y, such that x′ < y′.
Now we turn to the qualitative aspects of experience. We have already
remarked that we want to define the dimensionality of phenomenal quality
spaces before we define phenomenal quality points. Following Carnap, we
can define the phenomenal counterparts of quality spaces as connectivity
components, but not connectivity components with respect to a similarity
relation but rather with respect to the given relation Ov of qualitative over-
lap. E.g.: Basic elements which correspond qualitatively to convex subsets
Cq of the visual quality space do not stand in the Ov-relation to basic el-
ements that correspond qualitatively to convex subsets C ′q of the auditory
quality space. On the other hand, we may assume that the convex sets
of quality points that our basic elements correspond to are distributed over
their quality space in a sufficiently uniform way, such that every two of these
convex sets in a common quality space can be connected by a chain of pair-
wise overlappings. Note that we invoke considerations on the exclusion of
unfavourable circumstances here, just as Carmap did in the Aufbau, but in
our case one can show that proper “variedness” of basic elements actually
excludes such circumstances, in contrast with Carnap’s own case.
This amounts to:
• For all x ⊆ Bas:
x is a connectivity component ↔df
– for all y1, y2 ∈ x there are z1, . . . , zn ∈ Bas (n > 0), such that
Ov({y1, z1}), Ov({z1, z2}),. . . , Ov({zn−1, zn}), Ov({zn, y2});
– for all y1 ∈ x, for all y2 ∈ Bas: if there are z1, . . . , zn ∈ Bas
(n > 0), such that Ov({y1, z1}), Ov({z1, z2}),. . . , Ov({zn−1, zn}),
Ov({zn, y2}), then y2 ∈ x.
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Now that we have defined connectivity components, we can turn to the
question of how to assign dimensions to them. Here we make use of the
auxiliary notion of k-Hellyness, which is defined as follows:
• For all connectivity components x ⊆ Bas, for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . .}:
x is k-Helly ↔df
for every y ⊆ x the following two conditions are equivalent:
(a) for all z ⊆ y with |z| 6 k: Ov(z)
(b) Ov(y).22
The dimensionality of connectivity components may be defined in terms
of ‘k-Helly’. By the famous theorem of Helly (cf. Matousek 2002), every class
of closed, bounded, convex subsets of Rn is (n+ 1)-Helly relative to overlap
in terms of non-empty intersection, where ‘k-Helly’ is defined analogously to
the above. Moreover – in a non-degenerate case – a class of closed, bounded,
convex subsets of Rn is not n-Helly.23 E.g., the set of compact real intervals
can be regarded as a degenerate subset of R2 in the sense that it can be
regarded as a subset of R2 but that it can also be regarded as a subset of a
space with lower dimension, i.e., of R. We assume that the convex subsets of
the five-dimensional visual quality space that our basic elements correspond
to are distributed over it in a non-degenerate manner, i.e., their overlapping
patterns may not be realized in a space with lower dimension; accordingly
for all other quality spaces. Fortunately, the cardinality of the set of basic
elements does not play a role here, since Helly’s theorem also applies to
finite classes of convex sets. So we have:
• Constitution of k-dimensionality :
For all connectivity components x ⊆ Bas, for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . .}:
x is k-dimensional ↔df
x is (k + 1)-Helly, but not k-Helly.
Sense classes can thus be identified by dimensionality, which solves Good-
man’s second problem. In particular:
• Constitution of visual phenomenal space:
vs =df ιx (x is a connectivity component and x is 5-dimensional).
A visual basic element is simply a member of vs. Finally, within a sense
class, quality points can be defined as maximal sets that have non-empty
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common overlap, which solves Goodman’s first problem. Carnap’s problem
of “accidental” intersection does not occur, because rather than intersecting
sets of erlebs, which may simultaneously realize points in different qualitative
regions, we consider the overlapping of our basic elements, which correspond
to such regions themselves. E.g., in the case of the visual phenomenal space:
• Constitution of visual phenomenal quality point :
x is a visual phenomenal quality point ↔df
(i) x ⊆ ℘(vs), (ii) Ov(x),
(iii) there is no x′ ⊆ ℘(vs), s.t. x $ x′ and Ov(x′).
Let Pvis =df {x|x is a visual phenomenal quality point}.
In fact, within an n-dimensional sense class, quality points could be
defined as maximal sets of (n + 1)-fold overlappings, i.e., in (ii) and (iii)
we could restrict ourselves to demanding that Ov({y1, . . . , yn+1}) for all
y1, . . . , yn+1 ∈ x (respectively, x′). This is again a consequence of Helly’s
theorem. Note that if we had defined the phenomenal quality points that
belong to an n-dimensional quality space in terms of (n + 1)-fold overlap-
pings, it would have been crucial that the definition of dimensionality for
phenomenal quality spaces had been achieved before the definition of their
corresponding phenomenal quality points.
The set of visual phenomenal quality points can be equipped easily with
a metric notion of similarity. The more uniformly distributed the quality
regions and points in the visual space to which our visual basic elements
and visual phenomenal quality points correspond, the more this metric will
correspond to the actual metric on visual quality points:
• Constitution of similarity metric on phenomenal visual quality points:
For all x, y ∈ Pvis:
dvis(x, y) =df | {z ∈ vs |(z ∈ x ∧ z 6∈ y) ∨ (z 6∈ x ∧ z ∈ y)} |.
dvis measures the degree of separability of x and y in terms of visual
basic elements. It can be shown that dvis is a metric on Pvis.
Furthermore, we are able to define phenomenal quality spheres, a re-
lation of part-similarity for time instants or erlebs, a betweenness relation
for visual phenomenal quality points and accordingly for all other sense
modalities, and many further interesting concepts, such as different types of
qualitative or comparative similarity. All of Carnap’s terms for the qualita-
tive analysis of sense experience can be expressed on the basis of ‘∈’, ‘<’,
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‘Ov’; in particular, we can state a definition of the set of phenomenal colour
qualities, the set of visual sensations, the set of places in the visual field, the
neighbourhood relation for these places, and so forth (cf. section 5).
Summing up: Why is it that we were able to avoid Goodman’s problems
in our new setting? Our basic elements are already situated on the level of
Carnap’s phenomenal quality spheres, so we did not have to take the first
step of quasianalysis; the difficulties of companionship and imperfect com-
munity simply do not arise. Accidental intersections are taken care of by our
selection of basic elements and of Ov as the given relation of overlap. Since
a binary notion of overlap would not suffice, we conceive of Ov as a class
of sets, although a sevenary relation would actually do as well. In the case
of temporal overlap, a binary relation, which is definable in terms of ‘<’, is
sufficient, since time is one-dimensional. By Helly’s theorem, connectivity
components are guaranteed to receive their intended dimension numbers,
such that we are able to identify the different sense classes by their dimen-
sions. This is achieved by exploiting just the overlap relation for our basic
elements; the definition does not depend on a previous definition of phe-
nomenal quality points. All of the stated definitions yield at least approx-
imately the intended interpretations of the defined terms if only very mild
assumptions on the overall experience of our subject S are satisfied; these
assumptions can be made explicit extra-systematically, and – in contrast
with Carnap’s definitions of phenomenal quality spheres and phenomenal
quality points – if the formal structure of our phenomenal basis coincides
with the formal structure of the mathematical entities that it corresponds
to, then all defined terms do receive exactly their intended interpretations.
Why do we have reason to believe that our definitions subserve the aim
of determining a translation mapping that preserves empirical content? We
tried to make sure that the extension of every defined term in our system
is the phenomenal counterpart of its quality space preimage. If we were
successful in doing so, then the formal structure of the actual quality space
entities will show up in their phenomenal counterparts. E.g., the order struc-
ture of subjective time instants will be a coarse-grained image of the actual
order structure of time, the dimensional structure of connectivity compo-
nents will be a coarse-grained image of the actual dimensional structure of
quality spaces, the metric structure of phenomenal visual quality points will
be a coarse-grained image of the actual metric structure of visual quality
points, and so forth. If tr(A) is based on our definitions, it is therefore go-
ing to describe – though maybe in a coarse-grained fashion – the difference
that the truth of A makes to possible experience: While A is a description
of quality spaces and how they get realized or instantiated by experience,
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tr(A) is a description of the coarse-grained phenomenal copies of quality
spaces – of how the formal structure of quality spaces “imprints” on the
phenomenal structure of experience. Hence, at least approximately, tr(A)
should preserve the empirical content of A.
8 How to Solve Quine’s Problems
In the following we build on work which originated with Ramsey (1931) and
which was developed further by Carnap (1959, 1966a, 1966b) and Lewis
(1970).
Let us reconsider Carnap’s colour assignment sign ‘col’ in the Aufbau as
an example of a theoretical term. The procedure of setting up a translation
mapping for sentences that contain ‘col’ can be divided into two steps:
Step 1: Axiomatize Carnap’s (implicitly stated) theory for the pri-
mitive colour-assignment function sign ‘col’.24 Let A[col] be the sentence
which axiomatizes this theory; so A[col] will include clauses of the form
‘. . . col(x, y, z, t) = c . . .’, ‘col is such that. . . ’, and so forth.
The actual details of this axiomatization are tedious, because Carnap’s
maxims involve several auxiliary notions. Essentially, what one has to do is
to define what we call the set of colour assignment tuples, where a colour
assignment tuple collects the different components that Carnap refers to in
his informal exposition. Formally, a colour assignment tuple is an octuple
〈pv, dv, et, dev, lv, wlf, ca, ca2〉 where (i) pv is a mapping that tracks a pos-
sible point of view of S, (ii) dv is a possible main-direction-of-view mapping
of S, (iii) et maps erlebs to points of time, i.e., to real numbers, (iv) dev
represents a possible local-deviation-of-the-direction-of-view-mapping for S,
(v) lv is a possible line-of-view function that is associated with S, (vi)
wlf is a family of world-lines, i.e., of continuous trajectories through four-
dimensional space-time, (vii) ca is a partial mapping from space-time to the
set of S’s phenomenal colour qualities – it is intended to be the colour assign-
ment for points of space-time that are seen by S – and (viii) ca2 is a mapping
of the same type as ca but it is devoted to the assignment of colours to points
of space-time which are unseen by S. The different components have to sat-
isfy various conditions in order to let 〈pv, dv, et, dev, lv, wlf, ca, ca2〉 be a
colour assignment tuple. Some of these conditions ensure that the different
mappings harmonize with each other – e.g. the line-of-view mapping has
to “match up” with the point-of-view mapping, the main-direction-of-view
mapping, and the local-deviation-of-the-direction-of-view mapping. Other
conditions connect the mappings with S’s actual experience; in particular,
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et has to preserve the temporal ordering of erlebs, dev has to respect the
neighbourhood relation for places in the visual field, ca assigns points in
space-time to phenomenal colour quality points according to S’s visual sen-
sations and S’s line of view, as well as according to the assumed world-lines
wlf along which colours are supposed to “travel”; finally, ca2 fills in the
“gaps” that are left by ca. All of these conditions are implicitly contained
in Carnap’s specification of the colour assignment mapping in §126–127 of
the Aufbau. If expressed in our language, Carnap assumes that there are
pv, dv, et, dev, lv, wlf, ca, ca2, such that 〈pv, dv, et, dev, lv, wlf, ca, ca2〉 is a
colour assignment tuple and col is the result of “putting” the two partial
mappings ca and ca2 together25. However, being the fusion of the two
last components of a colour assignment tuple is only a necessary condi-
tion for being Carnap’s actual colour assignment col. Carnap’s maxims
in §126 may be reconstructed in the way that the colour assignment tu-
ple 〈pv, dv, et, dev, lv, wlf, ca, ca2〉 to which col belongs is maximally “inert”
among all colour assignment tuples. This can be made precise by introduc-
ing measures of inertness on the set of colour assignment tuples: a colour
change index (the higher the index, the less the total number of colour
changes), a curvature change index (the higher the index, the less the to-
tal sum of curvature changes), a velocity index (the higher the index, the
less the total sum of velocities), and a neighbourship preservation index
(the higher the index, the higher the spatial neighbourship preservation for
world lines). Each index maps a given colour assignment tuple to a par-
ticular number. Finally, based on these numbers, an inertness preorder for
colour assignment tuples can be introduced by which one may express that
one colour assignment tuple is less-than-or-equally-inert as another.26 What
Carnap’s theory of colour assignment finally amounts to is this: there are
pv, dv, et, dev, lv, wlf, ca, ca2, such that (a) 〈pv, dv, et, dev, lv, wlf, ca, ca2〉 is
a colour assignment tuple, (b) col is the result of taking the unions of the
two partial mappings ca and ca2, and (c) 〈pv, dv, et, dev, lv, wlf, ca, ca2〉 is
maximal with respect to the inertness preorder on colour assignment tuples.
A[col] is precisely this statement.27
Step 2: On the basis of this axiomatization, we offer three main options
of solving Quine’s problem by setting up translations of sentences involving
‘col’, i.e., sentences of the form B[col]:
Option 2.1: Translate B[col] into the so-called Ramsey sentence28
∃x(A[x] ∧B[x])
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Since the only descriptive terms in B[col], except for ‘col’, are ‘∈’, ‘<’, ‘Ov’
and terms which are defined on the basis of them, the resulting Ramsey
sentence only contains descriptive terms that can be reduced to ‘∈’, ‘<’,
‘Ov’. Furthermore it is easy to see that the Ramsey sentence has the same
logical consequences as the sentence A[col] ∧ B[col], as far as sentences are
concerned which solely consist of ‘∈’, ‘<’, ‘Ov’ (and logical terms); the two
sentences are thus empirically equivalent at least in the syntactic sense of
‘entailing the same observation statements’. The idea of the translation
mapping is that if someone claims B[col] to be true, he implicitly claims
A[col] ∧ B[col] to be true, because the extension of ‘col’ is given by the
theory A[col]. But A[col] ∧ B[col] may be regarded empirically equivalent
to ∃x(A[x] ∧B[x]). Ramsification can be viewed as a method of contextual
definition so that the empirical content of ‘col’ is only explained in, and
dependent on, the sentential contexts.
Ramsification is put forward sometimes as a means of making either
the instrumentalist view of theoretical terms or the structuralistic view of
scientific theories precise: according to the former, the only function of
theoretical terms is that they help “ordering” or keeping track of our ex-
periences in a neat way. The transition from sentences with theoretical
terms to their corresponding Ramsey sentences seems to preserve precisely
this aspect of theoretical terms. At the same time, the Ramsey sentences
seem to subserve the aims of structural realists who want to show that the
transition from former empirically successful but false theories to our cur-
rent improved theories preserves “structural content”; the Ramsey sentences
that are associated with theories are supposed to express their structural
content. However, our intention of using Ramsey sentences is neither tied
to an instrumentalistic picture of scientific discourse nor to a structuralistic
account of scientific progress. As far as the first is concerned, we do not
claim that A[col] ∧ B[col] is just a short-hand for ∃x(A[x] ∧ B[x]) or that
the two have the same meaning or pragmatic function. Our goal is simply
to set up a translation mapping for scientific sentences that maps sentences
to other sentences, such that (i) the latter are directly or indirectly com-
posed of our basic terms, and (ii) the translation preserves empirical content.
Ramsification is just a manner of achieving this goal. Concerning structural
realism, Newman’s observation (see Demopoulos & Friedman 1985), which is
usually regarded to contradict the structural realists’ aspirations of relying
on Ramsey sentences in order to clarify the notion of ‘structural content’, is
irrelevant for our project. Newman showed that a Ramsey sentence which
consists solely of observational and logical expressions is roughly as strong
as the set of all observational consequences of the original “unramsified”
32
theory together with a cardinality assumption on its universe of discourse.
Put differenty: the only “structure” which the Ramsey sentence adds to the
observational part of the theory is a cardinality claim (see Ketland 2004 for
the more precise model-theoretic statement). While this runs counter to the
intentions of structural realists, it leaves our new Aufbau untouched; for our
concerns, the translation of sentences in terms of Ramsey sentences only
has to preserve empirical content and this is what we get. The additional
cardinality constraint is irrelevant since our intended universe of discourse is
assumed to include the whole set theoretic hierarchy anyway. The Ramsifi-
cation of a theory with respect to a particular theoretical term only expresses
what the structure of the extensions of the other terms has to be like if the
theory is to come out as true. In our case, “the other terms” are just our
basic experiential terms, such that the Ramsification of Carnap’s theory of
colour assignment with respect to the theoretical term ‘col’ expresses what
the structure of S’s experience has to be like if the colour assignment theory
is to be true.
Other criticisms of Ramsification do not apply to our system either:
in particular, we do not regard Ramsification as subserving a particular
theory of truth or meaning. E.g., as Glymour (1980) observes, while the
inference from P [t] and Q[t] to P [t] ∧ Q[t] is logically valid, the Ramsified
inference from ∃xP [x] and ∃xQ[x] to ∃x(P [x] ∧ Q[x]) is not; but this is
only a problem if the Ramsey sentences are supposed to determine or re-
veal the truth conditions of the original sentences. In our case, Glymour’s
observation amounts to an observation about the properties of the transla-
tion mapping tr that we are after. He shows that tr is not compositional:
tr(B[col]) = ∃x(A[x] ∧ B[x]) and tr(C[col]) = ∃x(A[x] ∧ C[x]), however
tr(B[col]∧C[col]) = ∃x(A[x]∧B[x]∧C[x]) rather than tr(B[col]∧C[col]) =
∃x(A[x] ∧B[x]) ∧ ∃x(A[x] ∧C[x]). While this is a fact that is interesting in
itself, it certainly does not preclude tr from being the translation mapping
that we were looking for in our section 2.
Option 2.2: Define ‘col’ by a Lewis-style definite description (cf. Lewis 1970,
Papineau 1996):
col =df ιxA[x]
If we pursue this option, our intended translation mapping is actually given
by a definition (where ‘x’ runs over sets, including set-theoretic functions).
However, if we decide to make use of Russell’s theory of definite descriptions,
this definition gives rise to a contextual elimination procedure again which
resembles the one of the last option, the only difference being that now
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an additional uniqueness claim is included in the translation image. This
has the following effect: assume that B[col] is an atomic sentence; then
tr(B[col]) = B[ιxA[x]] = ∃x(A[x]∧∀y(A[y]→ y = x)∧B[x]), so B[col] does
not precisely have the same logical consequences in the language given by
‘∈’, ‘<’, ‘Ov’ as tr(B[col]), since B[col] does not imply ∃x(A[x]∧∀y(A[y]→
y = x)∧B[x]) although tr(B[col]) does (trivially). However, as Lewis argues,
if someone claims B[col] to be true, (i) he implicitly claims A[col] ∧ B[col]
to be true, because the extension of ‘col’ is given by the theory A[col], and
(ii) additionally it is tacitly presupposed that A[col] specifies the reference of
‘col’ uniquely. If so, the slight increase of empirical content that happens
to characterize the transition from the Ramsey sentence ∃x(A[x] ∧B[x]) to
the Lewis sentence ∃x(A[x] ∧ ∀y(A[y]→ y = x) ∧B[x]) is acceptable.
A more serious concern about translation mappings according to option
2.2 is the question of how likely sentences such as tr(B[col]) are true. Af-
ter all, ‘x’ runs over a set-theoretic universe; therefore, if A[x] is not of a
particularly restricted form, there will be “many” – in fact, infinitely many
– values of ‘x’ which satisfy A[x]. Even worse, there might be instances
of formulas A[x] that are not satisfied uniquely, independently of what the
extensions of ‘<’, ‘Ov’ are like, i.e., independently of the qualitative features
of S’s experiences.
One way of avoiding this is to restrict the quantification in translation im-
ages to “natural experiential sets (relations, functions)”: Not every member
of our set-theoretic universe would count as a “natural” object. Although
there may be many sets that satisfy A[x], there is hope that there is just one
natural set among them. Lewis (1970) uses precisely this “trick”, although
in his case the restriction is to natural physical kinds and relations. The sug-
gestion can be made precise by introducing two types of variables, such that
variables of one type would take arbitrary basic elements and sets as their
values, while the range of the variables of the other type would be restricted.
If x is a variable of the first kind and a is a variable of the second kind, then
the definition above should actually be changed into: col =df ιaA[a]. Al-
ternatively, one might introduce an additional unary predicate ‘Nat’ the
intended interpretation of which is the class of all natural sets. The cor-
responding definition of ‘col’ would thus be: col =df ιx(A[x] ∧ Nat(x)).
Although both of these options are viable in principle, they come with a
cost: in the first case, ‘a’ should no longer be regarded as a member of the
logical vocabulary of the language of our constitution system (cf. Schurz
2006); it is a descriptive sign with a genuinely empirical content. Accord-
ingly, in the second case, ‘Nat’ is another descriptive sign that is additional
to ‘∈’, ‘<’, ‘Ov’; in contrast with them, the extension of ‘Nat’ is unclear
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and cannot simply be explained extra-systematically in terms of examples
and a formal model. In both cases, the new signs would have to be counted
as further basic terms of the system.
Yet another way of dealing with the uniqueness problem is to include ad-
ditional clauses which are supposed to ensure that the definiens is satisfied
uniquely. In a nutshell, the idea is to define ‘col’ by definite description with
conventional choice. E.g., if all the x that satisfy A[x] could be well-ordered,
such that this well-ordering were definable in terms of ‘∈’, ‘<’, ‘Ov’, then the
following definition would do: col =df ιx∃y(A[y] ∧ ∧x is least w.r.t. . . .)
(where ‘. . . ’ is to be replaced by the defining clause of the well-order).
Moreover, if such a well-ordering is not expressible – which is likely to be
the case – then one might adopt the following strategy: for every colour
assignment tuple, define its “coarsening”, i.e., a tuple of coarse-grained ver-
sions of the components of the former. E.g., let the coarsening of a colour
assignment tuple include mappings ca′ and ca′2 which assign colours to, say,
cubical regions of space-time; a region would be mapped to a phenomenal
colour quality c if and only if the mappings ca and ca2 of the original colour
assignment tuple map the measure-theoretic majority of points in the re-
gion to c (there are several possible variations of this recipe). The point
of the coarsening is that if it is done in the right way, there will be finitely
many coarsenings, as long as space-time gets shrunk to a sufficiently large
sphere; the inertness indices that we have introduced above could be de-
fined directly for coarsenings; finally, a well-ordering of coarsenings may be
introduced, since there are definable enumerations of cubical regions, of time
instants, of the set of phenomenal colours, of the set of visual sensations,
and thus of the finite set of colour assignment coarsenings. Hence we can
define: col =df ιx∃y(A[y] ∧ Coarsening(x, y) ∧ x is least w.r.t. . . .) (where
‘. . . ’ is now to be replaced by the defining clause of the well-order for coars-
enings). In this way, uniqueness can be guaranted without making use of
quantification over natural classes. While the approximation of colour as-
signment tuples by their “coarse-grained” counterparts is certainly reflected
by a change of meaning as far as the translation of sentences with ‘col’ to
sentences without ‘col’ is concerned, the empirical content of the original
sentences is likely to be unaffected. Our observer S may certainly be as-
sumed to have finite capacities of discrimination herself, thus an assignment
of colours to regions rather than points is all that is asked for if one is only
interested in the preservation of empirical content. The underlying thought
of each of these variants of option 2.2 is that the intended uniqueness of
definite descriptions can be guaranteed if there is a manner of expressing
a unique selection method for the objects that satisfy the description. The
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choice itself is conventional in the same sense as it is a matter of convention
whether we choose Kuratowski’s definition of ordered pairs in axiomatic set
theory or a different one as long as the characterizing axiom for ordered pairs
is satisfied. The drawback of this translation method is that the empirical
contents of theoretical sentences would be determined only up to convention,
but this is perhaps excusable. Carnap’s Aufbau itself may be regarded as a
conventionalistic project (cf. Runggaldier 1984).29
Option 2.3: Define ‘col’ by a Hilbert-style epsilon term (see Zach 2003 for
an overview):
col =df xA[x]
This is like defining ‘col’ in terms of a definite description, however the
uniqueness presupposition of iota-terms, and hence the problem that we
have just dealt with, can be avoided: xA[x] denotes an object that satisfies
A[x] if there is one; otherwise, xα[x] is undefined (and so are all sentences
containing it). The logic and semantics of epsilon terms has been studied in-
tensively since the days of the Hilbert school, and Carnap himself suggested
to analyze theoretical terms as epsilon terms (cf. Carnap 1959, 1966b; see
also Psillos 2000). Since defining expressions on the basis of epsilon terms is
nothing but the singular term counterpart to Ramsification – both express
existence claims – the former preserves empirical content just as the latter
does.30
We suggest that one of these options can be applied in order to trans-
late sentences with theoretical terms into sentences in the language of our
constitution system, such that this translation preserves empirical content.
According to either of these options, scientific sentences will normally be
translated to rather “longish” sentences that include various fragments of
scientific theories (thoug maybe stated in a form in which predicate constants
have been replaced by variables for sets). In this sense, some of Quine’s holis-
tic aspirations are indeed satisfied by our translation mappings. As Quine
points out,
If we can aspire to a sort of logischer Aufbau der Welt at all, it must
be one in which the texts slated for translation into observational and
logico-mathematical terms are mostly broad theories taken as wholes.
[. . .]
The translation of a theory would be a ponderous axiomatization of all
the experiential difference that the truth of the theory would make. . . we
may, following Peirce, still fairly call this the empirical meaning of the-
ories” (Quine 1969).
36
Since – as we claim – the extensions of our theoretical terms are typically
given by certain theoretical modules or building blocks rather than by “the”
scientific theory in total, our translation mappings only conform to a partial
sort of holism. Furthermore, Quine seems to have overlooked the possi-
bility of using these theory fragments in order to set up term-to-term and
sentence-to-sentence translations which preserve empirical content. This
solves Quine’s problem as far as our new Aufbau project is concerned.
Three final remarks on our method of approaching Quine’s problem:
– If we presuppose option 2.2 for the moment, then the definition of
theoretical terms may involve our basic terms as well as terms – including
theoretical terms – that have already been defined. This leads to a system
of levels of terms, such that the definition of a term of level n only involves
terms on levels below n. Friedman (1999) poses the question how such
a system of constitutional levels is supposed to come to terms with the
phenomenon of revision: E.g., the subjective colour assignment that is at
first based solely on the immediate qualitative experience of our subject S
has to be revised subsequently on the basis of the reports of other subjects on
the one hand and on the basis of hypotheses about scientific regularities on
the other; but our knowledge of other subjects and of scientific regularities
presupposes our subjective colour assignment. Accordingly, the ultimate
rational reconstruction of col seems to depend on the definition of concepts
applying to other subject’s reports and on further scientific concepts, whilst
the definition of these other concepts seems to presuppose the definition of
‘col’. We submit that this circle can be broken by introducing new “high-
level” theoretical terms as refinements of theoretical terms that have already
been defined on lower levels. Our definition of ‘col’ would e.g. be the
definition of a preliminary colour assignment. On the basis of ‘col’ and
other primitive or defined terms, definitions of further scientific terms can
be given. On the basis of the latter, a new term ‘col∗’ may be introduced the
extension of which may be regarded as a refinement of the original colour
assignment col; and so forth. Carnap himself hints at this procedure when
he defines what he calls a “preliminary time order” in §120 of the Aufbau.
– §155 of the Aufbau is devoted to an application of our option 2.2 in
order to define what was originally meant to be Carnap’s basic relation of
recollection of similarity. The latter is defined as the binary relation that
satisfies a particular high-level condition that is supposed to be characteris-
tic of the relation of similarity recollection. In fact, Carnap uses the variant
of 2.2 from above in which we suggest to make use of an additional predi-
cate ‘Nat’, or in Carnap’s terminology, ‘Found’. The extension of ‘Found’
is supposed to be the class of “founded” or “experienceable” or “phenom-
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enally natural” relations (cf. §154). Thus, Carnap’s definition of the basic
empirical predicate of his system is an early instance of Lewis’ (1970) idea of
defining theoretical terms by definite description, the only difference being
that where Carnap makes the intended quantification over natural relations
explicit in his object language, Lewis leaves it implicit in the metalinguis-
tic interpretation of the variables he employs. As Demopoulos & Friedman
(1985) and Friedman (1999) argue convincingly, ‘Nat’ or ‘Found’ are not
logical terms, therefore the strong structuralistic thesis that was presented
in section 2 when we dealt with the second interpretation of the Aufbau
is not supported by the existence of definitions of this sort. This failed
structuralistic claim is of course not a part of our own thesis.
– Why is it that we have to make use of contextual definitions, or explicit
definitions on the basis of additional logical resources such as iota-terms or
epsilon-terms, in the transition from the autopsychological domain to the
physical domain, while we have been able to restrict ourselves to standard
explicit definitions in the former? The exact answer to this question would
need more elaboration, but our hypothesis is that the approach in the last
section is actually not as different from the one in this section as it may seem
at first glance. Terms such as ‘quality point’, ‘visual place’, ‘visual sensation’
and so on, are theoretical terms themselves – their extensions are given
by little theories on cognition. However, their corresponding definitions
in terms of, say, Lewis’ definite descriptions can be turned into equivalent
explicit definitions which are of the same, or of a similar, form as the explicit
definitions that we have given in our section 7. In contrast to expressions
about the immediate qualitative properties of our experience, the empirical
extension of ‘col’ is too complex to be cast into a standard explicit definition
on the basis of our primitive terms alone without recourse to logical devices
such as iota-terms or epsilon-terms.
One final remark: we did not cover dispositional terms in this section
since they are not be regarded as theoretical terms. Disposition terms con-
stitute a separate and important problem for an Aufbau-like programme,
but not a problem that we can deal with in this paper (cf. footnote 5).
More generally, the translation of modal expressions, in particular function
signs for objective single-case probability measures, and also of statistical
expressions, needs special treatment that has to be postponed to a different
occasion.
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9 Summary and Outlook
We have finally arrived at a scheme for translating scientific sentences A to
sentences tr(A) where the latter consist solely of logico-mathematical signs
(logical connectives, quantifiers, ‘=’, ‘∈’, ‘ι’, ‘’) and terms that refer to
experience (‘<’, ‘Ov’). In the case of the “autopsychological” terms that
we dealt with in section 7, tr was given by standard explicit definitions. In
section 8 we made several suggestions of how to translate sentences that
include the colour assignment function sign ‘col’ (and accordingly for other
theoretical terms): either to apply Ramsification, or to define ‘col’ in terms
of a definite description, or on the basis of an epsilon term. Either way the
translation is set up, logical and mathematical signs are always left invariant
by translation.
As far as the preservation of empiricial contents is concerned, we took
care that the extensions of all autopsychological terms are defined as to have
the phenomenal counterparts of qualitative objects as their intended inter-
pretations. This should guarantee that every definiendum of a definition in
section 7 is empirically equivalent to its corresponding definiens. Finding
solutions to Goodman’s problems was a necessary prerequisite for achieving
this. The translations of sentences that involve ‘col’ in terms of Ramsey or
Lewis or Hilbert/Carnap sentences can be shown to preserve empirical con-
tent while doing justice to Quine’s holistic concerns about the corresponding
passage of the original Aufbau. Since the extension of ‘∈’ may be assumed
to be fixed – at least from a Platonistic point of view on mathematics –
each translation tr(A) expresses a constraint only on the extensions of ‘<’
and ‘Ov’. As the last section has shown, this constraint might be a fairly
complex one. E.g., tr(A) might say that there is a mapping which is de-
fined on a set in our set-theoretic hierarchy such that some condition that
is expressed in terms of ‘∈’, ‘<’, ‘Ov’ is satisfied; the existence of such a
function might correspond to a situation in which S has experiences which
instantiates some complex pattern of temporal succession and qualitative
overlap. Mathematical expressions are needed for two reasons: (i) they are
necessary to set up the definitions of autopsychological terms; (ii) they occur
in scientific theories; therefore, according to the methods of translation that
we discussed in the last section, mathematical terms will show up in the
translation of sentences with theoretical terms. In either case they enable
us to express constraints on experience that could not be expressed on the
basis of ‘<’ and ‘Ov’ alone.
The translation mapping that is induced by our choice of basis in section
6, our choice of explicit definitions in section 7, and finally our choice of ex-
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plixit or contextual definitions in section 8 is relativized to empirical theories
in three ways: the basis is selected extra-systematically according to theo-
retical considerations; the definitions in the autopsychological domain only
assign the intended extensions to their definienda if certain empirical hy-
potheses about S and her experiences are satisfied – e.g., S has sufficiently
varied experiences, basic elements are distributed qualitatively in a suffi-
ciently uniform manner, and so forth; the explicit or contextual definitions
of ‘col’ and of other theoretical terms include theory fragments. Thus, it is
certainly not the case that our translation mapping is given by unrevisable
rules of correspondence in the traditional sense of the word. Instead, every
revision of our empirical theories may lead to a corresponding revision of
the translation mapping. The choice of our translation mapping depends
on empirical theories and so does the notion of ‘empirical content’ that we
have used.
At least for all sentences A which solely consist of the linguistic expres-
sions that we have investigated in this article, the thesis put forward in
section 2 has been defended, except for one part: we still need to show that
tr(A) expresses a subject-invariant constraint on experiences. We leave this
part for another paper.
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Notes
1There is not a lot of recent systematic work which aims to continue, extend, or modify
Carnap’s programme in the Aufbau. Moulines (1991), Mormann (1991), and the “Canberra
Plan” (see Chalmers and Jackson 2001) are important exceptions.
2In the Aufbau, Carnap states some examples of what the translations tr(A) of some
concrete sentences A are like. For reasons of space, we will not be able to do so in this
paper, but we will have to restrict ourselves to just a sketch of what such translations will
be like in the new constitution system that we are going to develop below.
3However, we give a detailed model-theoretic analysis of empirical content in an un-
published draft; cf. Leitgeb (2008).
4In philosophy of science it is common understanding these days to explain the ex-
pressions ‘empirically equivalent’ and ‘experience’, as used in our new thesis, in terms of
intersubjectively observable properties of physical entities. However, before the classical
protocol sentence debate, it was simply a matter of choice whether one would analyze
experience in terms of a physical basis or a subjective basis; different choices would be
appropriate for different purposes, or so is Carnap’s claim in the Aufbau. Without wanting
to elaborate on this claim, we still regard it as true. Consequently, we want to leave open
at this point how to understand ‘empirically equivalent’ and ‘experience’ exactly. Later
on we will opt for a subjective basis that is to serve a similar epistemological purpose as
Carnap’s in the Aufbau, i.e., to reconstruct scientific expressions on the basis of terms that
are epistemically prior to them: terms for subjective experience.
5Since our new thesis refers to a translation mapping that is not necessarily supposed to
preserve meaning but only empirical content, one should maybe use a term different from
‘translation’ in this context. However, in order to compare the old theses to the new one,
it is handy to use the same term. So ‘translation’ ought to be taken in an abstract sense
as a mapping from one language into another which satisfies some preservation conditions
that are specified separately and which do not necessarily concern meaning.
6In our context, the philosophical and mathematical differences between different sug-
gestions for axiomatic systems of set theory are not of major importance.
7If one prefers to do so, one may just as well replace ‘realize’ by ‘’represent’ – no
demaning metaphysical views get expressed here.
8This mixture of qualitative and temporal components was rightly criticized by Moulines
(1991) for having some counterintuitive consequences. In our new system, qualitative as-
pects will be separated conceptually from temporal ones by reserving one basic relation
for each of them.
9For simplicity, we will not always be using Carnap’s original terms.
10It can be shown that Carnap’s definition of ‘Sim’ does not always subserve this in-
tention. However, for the sake of the argument, we will ignore this additional problem of
Carnap’s procedure.
11In a one-dimensional quality space, a quality sphere of diameter  is simply an interval
of length .
12Carnap discusses this notion of dimensionality in his Abriss der Logistik (Carnap
1929).
13We will not go into details how meaning holism and confirmational holism differ from
each other or what their logical relationship looks like. Moreover, Quine’s view on this
topic is not completely clear itself and was subject to subtle changes throughout the years.
14Carnap of course dealt with an undefinability problem himself when he studied the
difficulty of defining dispositional terms on the basis of observation terms (Carnap 1936–
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1937). But this topic should not be mixed up with the problem concerning ‘col’: dispo-
sition terms are not theoretical terms as their extensions are not given by theories; they
stand somewhere “in between” observation terms and theoretical terms. We will not be
able to deal with Carnap’s problem here.
15The extension of our new basic predicate ‘Ov’ will actually be a set of sets of basic
elements, which can be seen as a formal reconstruction of a Lewis-style relation of basic
elements with variable arity. However, as we will point out below, one could in principle
dispense with this basic predicate in favour of a sevenary predicate that applies to basic
elements directly.
16Once again, all sets of such experiential tropes, all sets of sets of experiential tropes,
and so forth, will be members of our intended universe of discourse, too.
17In our case, convex sets will always be subsets of some Euclidean space Rn. A subset
X of Rn is called convex if and only if for every x, y ∈ X, the straight line segment
between x and y is included in X, i.e., for all λ ∈ [0, 1] : λx + (1 − λ)y ∈ X. In the
case of n = 1, convex sets simply coincide with bounded or unbounded real intervals, and
hence bounded closed convex sets coincide with bounded closed intervals. Informally, a
convex set is closed under “betweenness”: if p and r are members of a convex set Q and
q is between p and r, then q is a member of Q as well. By ‘extended’ we simply mean
non-empty and not “point-like”, i.e., neither identical to the empty set nor to a singleton
set.
18In the preface of the second edition of the Aufbau, Carnap notes that he would now
have opted also for phenomenal quality points as basic elements.
19Indeed, several of the definitions in the next section are inspired by Russell’s (1954,
1961).
20There is nothing “magical” about the number seven: the overlap predicate for basic
elements would need to have an arity that is at least of magnitude highest dimension
of quality space involved plus two in order to let our definitions be adequate. Since the
five-dimensional visual quality space is supposed to be of largest dimension, this yields an
arity of seven.
21This follows from Helly’s theorem, one of the classic results in Convex Geometry; see
our definition of dimensionality. The point of assuming that our basic elements correspond
temporally to bounded and closed convex sets was that Helly’s theorem for infinite sets of
convex regions only applies if these convex regions are compact, i.e., bounded and closed.
22|z| is the cardinality of z. See Berge (1989) for the notion of k-Hellyness.
23As in the temporal case, we have assumed our basic elements to correspond to closed
and bounded convex regions for the reason that Helly’s theorem does not apply to arbitrary
infinite classes of convex regions, without compactness being assumed as well.
24Strictly, ‘col’ will not be a function sign in the first-order language sense, but rather
an individual constant. However, since the individual constant ‘col’ is intended to denote
a particular function which is a member of the set-theoretic universe that we presuppose,
one may still conceive of it as a function sign, except that in contrast to proper function
signs, predicates may be applied to it.
25This is possible since the domain on which ca is defined is disjoint from the domain
on which ca2 is defined.
26One way of introducing such an inertness preorder is to rank the index functions
by priority and to order the colour assignment tuples lexicographically according to the
priority ranks.
27We have actually written up this statement in the language of our new constitution
system. However, for the sake of brevity, we cannot reproduce it here.
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28The original Ramsey sentences are second-order sentences. But since we presuppose
set theory, second order quantifiers can be construed as first-order quantifiers.
29There are actually further variants of these options, which we have not discussed:
e.g., Ramsification might involve quantification to natural classes, too, which would be a
variant of 2.1.
30In Leitgeb (2008) we actually prove that both Ramsification and epsilon term sub-
stitution preserve empirical content, within a formal possible worlds framework in which
every possible world contains an experiential substructure and where each possible world
represents an internalistically accessible epistemic possibility.
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